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Old 08-15-2018, 2:54 PM
sarabellum sarabellum is offline
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Originally Posted by ritter View Post
Note the "longstanding" part of prohibitions as well as "in" sensitive places, not "near" sensitive places. There are longstanding prohibitions on sale of firearms to felons, etc. When looked at in historical context, that is what the opinion is indicating are permissible, not rosters.
The Supreme Court when explaining, "Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of the full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on . . ." indicates an expansive power to regulate by the state and federal governments followed by examples listed in the inclusive, "such as," and "or." Id. The reasoning that because rosters of acceptable firearms for sale must not an example provided by District of Columbia v. Heller such a roster must be unconstitutional is not sound reasoning, since the decision indicates that the Court does not list all forms of of arms regulation that could be valid, as they are all presumptively valid as long as they do not completely prohibit arms possession, " . . . nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on . . ."

Heller, when viewed closely, is a bitter pill to swallow for folks, who hero worship Scalia.

The language, "We know of no other enumerated constitutional right whose core protection has been subjected to a freestanding 'interest-balancing' approach," is not a rule indicating that regulation of arms possession by the states is unconstitutional, especially in lieu of the above more specific rule (more specific language controls over more general language). Rather, the language you cited was the summary in the conclusion (IRAC) of the reasoning that the core of the Second Amendment is arms possession, "Justice Breyer’s assertion that individual self-defense is merely a 'subsidiary interest' of the right to keep and bear arms, see post, at 36, is profoundly mistaken. He bases that assertion solely upon the prologue—but that can only show that self-defense had little to do with the right’s codification; it was the central component of the right itself." Thereafter, the analysis was whether the DC statute significantly infringed on the right and whether that infringement violated the constitution. The conclusion was that the DC's complete prohibition of arms possession violated the Second Amendment. The " . . .nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt . . ." and "not unlimited right" language means, in the absence of outright prohibition on possession, anything goes.

The expansive language in Heller ratifying regulation by the states is a rule. That rule is now binding on every single lower court in the nation until such time as the Supreme Court reverses Heller.

Last edited by sarabellum; 08-15-2018 at 3:24 PM..
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